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Abstract
If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a
preceding cause? For example, if the universe began with
the Big Bang and if God brought it about, did the Big
Bang then have a preceding cause? The standard answer
is: yes, it was caused by a divine willing. I propose an al-
ternative view: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are
not initiated by willings, undertakings, or volitions, but
God brings about the intended event directly. Presenting
a solution to the dilemma of free will I explain what ‘bring-
ing about directly’ means and show that the question of
what an action begins with is distinct from the question
whether it is a basic action.
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1 The divine willing view
Assume that the universe had a beginning and that that begin-
ning was caused by God. Was there then an event that caused
the beginning of the universe? More generally, if God causes an
event E in the universe beginning at t, is there then an event
C beginning before t which causes E? The usual answer is yes,
I shall argue that the true answer is no. God can bring about
events in the universe in a certain sense ‘directly’ so that they
have no preceding cause.
The usual view we find, for example, in Hofmann and Rosen-
krantz’s book Divine Attributes (2002):
Necessarily, if an agent, A, intentionally [...] brings
about an event [...], then A performs such an action
either by deciding (or choosing) to do so or by en-
deavoring (or willing) to do so. Thus, if God exists,
then he performs actions [...] via his decisions or en-
deavorings. (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2002, p. 103)
The authors proceed to argue that to endeavour something is
to engage in a ‘volitional activity’, and ‘a volitional activity of
God would be an intrinsic change in him’ (103 f). Only things
in time can change, therefore God is in time.
Richard Swinburne gives a similar argument for God being in
time: God’s ‘acting must be prior to the effects that his action
causes’ (Swinburne 1993, p. 216), because causes are earlier than
their effects. Also Quentin Smith assumes that there would be
divine willings if there were a God, when he investigates ‘the re-
lation between [God’s] act of willing (an event) and the beginning
of the universe (another event)’ (Smith 1996, p. 170).
These authors assume that every action, at least every free
action, involves an action event in the agent’s mind which causes
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the intended event. Defenders of agent causation call it an ‘un-
dertaking’ (Chisholm 1976) or ‘trying’ (Swinburne 1997, p. 93),
others call it a ‘volition’, ‘endeavouring’, or ‘willing’. From this
assumption it follows that if God acts, then there are divine un-
dertakings which cause the events which God brings about. I call
this the divine willing view. On this view, if the universe began
with the Big Bang, then there is a divine undertaking which
began before the Big Bang and which caused the Big Bang.
In this article I propose an alternative to this view. To explain
and defend it, I shall first present a solution to the dilemma of
free will. Then I shall distinguish the question of what an action
process begins with from the question of whether an action is
‘basic’. I shall investigate, for human as well as for divine actions,
what the action process begins with and which actions are basic.
I shall defend the view that there are no divine willings and
that the beginning of the universe had no preceding cause. More
generally, my thesis is that God can bring about events in the
universe so that they have no preceding cause. This thesis is
independent from the assumption that the universe began with
the Big Bang and that the universe had a beginning.
I am presupposing that God is in time and that there was
a time before the beginning of the universe. (As for example
defended by Swinburne 1993, ch. 12.) On the view that God is
outside time, it would be clear that an event brought about by
God does not have a preceding cause. Further, I presuppose that
if event x caused event y, then x began earlier than y. Therefore
saying that the Big Bang had no preceding cause is equivalent
to saying that it had no event cause.
2 The dilemma of free will
The dilemma of free will is that the following two sentences seem
to be true:
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(A) If an action has a deterministic cause (and thus is the
result of a deterministic process), then it is not free, because
it is determined and thus the agent has no control over it.
(B) If an action does not have a deterministic cause, then it
is not free either, because then it happens by chance and is
therefore not under the control of the agent.
By a ‘deterministic’ cause one usually understands one which
necessitates its effect. (A) means that if an action was the result
of a deterministic causal process and thus necessitated by preced-
ing events, then it was not free. The agent could not intervene,
he ‘had no choice’, as we say. That is just the sort of scenario
we mean when we say that someone is not free. (B) applies the
principle that an event is either the result of a deterministic pro-
cess or the result of an indeterministic, chancy process. By a
free action we mean one which has its origin in the agent, the
agent chooses which action occurs, motivated through reasons
or inclinations. If an action was the result of an indeterministic
process, then it occurred by chance and thus it was not up to the
agent which action would occur. The agent did not have control
over the occurrence of the action. If both, (A) and (B), were cor-
rect, then free actions would be impossible, as many have claimed
(e.g. Hobbes 1654, p. 32; Honderich 2002; Strawson 2002).
Compatibilists reject (A). They hold that free will is compat-
ible with the doctrine of determinism that every event is neces-
sitated by preceding events and so is the result of a deterministic
causal process. Many compatibilists believe in determinism, that
is part of their motivation for embracing compatibilism. Another
possible motivation for compatibilism is assumption (B) that if
an action is not the result of a deterministic process, then it is the
result of an indeterministic process and hence occurs by chance
and is not under the control of the agent and is not done for reas-
ons. My view is that (A) is true and that there is a satisfactory
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reply to (B). So I shall now present an incompatibilist solution
of the dilemma which rejects (B) and in this respect makes the
refuge to compatibilism unnecessary. My view is incompatibilist
in the usual sense that it describes free actions as something that
is incompatible with determinism as usually understood as the
Hobbesian1 doctrine that every event is necessitated by preceding
events. However, I have argued elsewhere (Wachter 2009, ch. 7.6)
that the usual notion of determinism describes something that is
impossible and that there is another view which can adequately
be called ‘determinism’ and which is compatible with free will.
Likewise, there is a more useful meaning for ‘deterministic’ than
the usual one.
The dilemma of free will arises through the assumption, which
we can call mechanicism, that an event is either the result of
a deterministic process so that it is necessitated by preceding
events, or the result of an indeterministic, chancy process. We
should reject this assumption. We see why if we consider what
a free action would be. A free action of a man (or of any agent
with a body) which changes some physical state in the universe
involves a physical causal process. The intended event is the
result of a causal process in the brain, nerves, and muscles. We
can call this the action process. If the action process goes back
for ever, then the action is not free because it is not under the
control of the agent and the agent is forced to do it (regardless of
whether he feels forced or free). So the action process must have a
beginning, the ‘initial event’. The initial event is a complete cause
of the intended result of the action. A part of the initial event
may be the result of a causal process, but at least a part of it
must be not the result of a causal process, neither a deterministic
nor a chancy one. We can call this event the ‘initiating event’.
1As Hobbes (1851, § 2.9.5) said, all events ‘have their necessity in things
antecedent.’
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How does the initiating event occur?
Some philosophers hold that it must be the result of a process
which is indeterministic at some stage. Randolph Clarke argues
that it has to be caused indeterministically: ‘When a decision is
freely made [...] there remained until the making of that decision
a genuine chance that the agent would not make that decision.’
(Clarke 2000, p. 21, similarly Balaguer 2009, p. 4) Others hold
that in a free action the decision is caused deterministically but
the process of deliberation leading to the decision is indetermin-
istic. (Dennett 1978; Fischer and Ravizza 1992; Mele 1995)
It is true that if an action process were indeterministic, in
one of these two ways, then it would be in some sense true that
it was possible, until the action occurred, that another action
would occur instead of the one that did occur. In this sense it
is true that the agent could have acted differently. But this is
not what we are getting at when we say that a free agent ‘could
have done otherwise’. If it is a matter of indeterminacy which
action occurs, then it is not up to the agent what he does. An
action that occurs by chance is not a free action, because the
agent lacks control over which action occurs. If an action is the
result of an indeterministic process, then the agent has as little
control over it as an agent has over an action that occurs as the
result of a deterministic process.
So how does the initiating event occur? If the action is free,
then it is neither the result of a deterministic process, nor the
result of an indeterministic process. It is not the result of a
causal process at all. Is there another way how an event can come
about? Yes, the agent might bring about the event directly. That
means that the event had no preceding cause, but its occurrence
was due to the agent. The agent made it pop up. It would be
misleading to say that it was caused by the agent’s decision or
choice, because that sounds as if the decision was a preceding
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event which caused it. But we can say that it was the agent’s
decision or choice. The agent may or may not have intended to
bring it about. He must have had some intention governing the
action, but perhaps he was not aware of this event at all. We
can call an event which in this sense has no preceding cause but
is due to an agent a choice event. (I have defended this solution
already in Wachter 2003b.)
Human actions involve mental events that are suitably called
‘willings’, ‘tryings’, or ‘undertakings’. If I try to raise my arm
but the arm does not move because it is paralysed, then there
is still the trying, which is a mental event of a certain type. If
I try to raise my arm successfully, then there is an event of the
same type. It initiates the causal process leading to the rising of
the arm. In human actions the choice events seem to be always
tryings. When a man intentionally moves a part of his body, then
the action process starts with and through the trying, which lasts
until the end of the action, and at all stages the trying has no
preceding cause but is a choice event.
Choice events will seem mysterious to many philosophers, be-
cause it has become an unquestioned dogma that there is only
one way how an event can come about, namely by being caused
through preceding events and thus through being the result of
a causal process. But there is nothing incoherent or mysteri-
ous about choice events. The question is just whether there are
choice events, but it is not our task here to examine the evidence
for this. Choice events are only mysterious from the point of
view that every event occurs through being caused by preceding
events. In itself they are no more mysterious than events that
are caused by preceding events.
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3 Is this ‘agent causation’?
One might think that this solution of the dilemma of free will
is the same as what some authors have called ‘agent causation’,
but this is not so. Roderick Chisholm and Richard Swinburne,
in their defence of ‘agent causation’, say that an action is free if
the ‘undertaking’ or ‘trying’ has ‘no sufficient causal condition’
(Chisholm 1976, p. 201) or if it is not ‘causally necessitated’
(Swinburne 1997, p. 231) or not ‘fully caused by earlier events’
(Swinburne 1994, p. 25). That leaves open the possibility that it
is a chance event, over which the agent would have no control.
We must dismiss all approaches which assume that chance is a
condition for freedom, because chance would diminish control.
Randolph Clarke defends ‘agent causation’ in the following
way: ‘There is a relation of producing, bringing about, or making
happen in which one event stands to another when the first dir-
ectly causes the second. For an agent to directly cause an event
(such as an action) is for that agent – an enduring substance –
to stand in that relation to that event.’ (Clarke 2005, p. 411)
But he also says that a free action is ‘caused by the agent and [!]
nondeterministically caused by events such as the agent’s having
certain reasons. [. . . ] The action caused by the agent is said to
be also caused by the indicated events.’ (410)
Does that mean that the action is overdetermined? If not,
then there are not two ways how an event can come about, event
causation and agent causation. Either the action (or the begin-
ning of the action process) is the result of a causal process, or
it is brought about by the agent in the sense of being a choice
event. Of course, if the action (or the event with which the action
process begins) were the result of a causal process, then it would
still be true to say that the agent did it or brought it about, but
that does not mean that the action came about in a special way,
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distinct from event causation. Clarke might mean by ‘There is
agent causation’ just that sentences of the form ‘Miller brought
about x’ cannot be analysed in terms of sentences of the form
‘Event x caused event y’, but this provides no solution for the
dilemma of free will at all.2
If, on the other hand, the action is overdetermined and thus
also a choice event, then the agent could have brought about
another action instead, one which is not also caused by preced-
ing events. Clarke probably has in mind that human actions
are always ‘caused by the agent and nondeterministically caused
by events’, but why should that be so? Why and how should
the agent and the events be so connected that every action is
overdetermined?
I suspect that Clarke accepts the mechanistic doctrine that
every event is the result of a (deterministic or indeterministic)
causal process. But then there is no good reason for saying that
there is agent causation, besides event causation, as another way
how an event can come about. In any case Clarke’s theory does
not claim that the action has a beginning that has no preceding
cause, and therefore, in my view, it does not solve the dilemma
of free will.
Timothy O’Connor states in his agent causation theory that
the agent has it ‘directly within his power to cause any of a range
of states of intention’. (O’Connor 2000, p. 72) So there is a causal
relation between the agent and some event. However, I cannot
find anywhere that he says that this event has no preceding cause.
E. J. Lowe’s theory of agent causation is closer to mine. When
a human agent, A, caused by acting an event e, such as motion
in his hand, then that is an instance of agent causation. For
2Chisholm 1978, 622 f and Lowe 2008, p. 123 explicitly understand ‘agent
causation’ in this sense. Wachter 2003a, p. 187 criticises this.
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Lowe this leaves open whether some prior events were causes of
e, but he finds it ‘perfectly conceivable’ that ‘e occurred as a con-
sequence of A’s agency and yet e was not causally determined
by prior events (nor, we may suppose, did e have the probab-
ility of its occurrence fully determined by prior events).’ (129)
In another passage he calls agents ‘unmoved movers’ (12) and
‘initiators of new causal chains’. His solution to the dilemma of
free will therefore seems to me to be in essence similar to mine,
although he says that the agent’s causing e has no cause at all
(129) because it is no event at all (131), and although he objects
to calling agents ‘causes’ of their volitions (in a yet unpublished
article).
I conclude that, with the exception of Lowe, the contemporary
authors who have called their view ‘agent causation’ do not solve
the dilemma of free will because they fail to claim that there is
another way how an event can come to occur and that an event
brought about in this way by an agent has therefore no preceding
cause.
4 God does not need undertakings
So a human action always starts with a choice event that is a
trying. Are divine actions like this? Was the Big Bang caused
by a trying in God’s mind? Imagine someone locked into a room
with a switchboard. Pressing buttons on the switchboard makes
some machines, which the person can observe through a window,
behave in certain ways. All the person can do outside his room,
he can do by pressing certain buttons on the switchboard, and he
can do it only in this way. Pressing buttons starts certain causal
processes which lead to certain behaviours of the machines. He
does not know what these processes are, but he knows which
buttons he has to press in order to achieve which results.
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Similarly, we can act only in certain ways. When you try to
raise your arm, then a certain action process is started automat-
ically. We can change the material world only through our body,
and we can move our body only through these mental events
which we can call tryings or undertakings. The trying, which
an identity theorist would take to be identical to a brain event,
causes certain events in your nerves and muscles. There is no
way you can cut short this process, e.g. by directly making your
muscles contract, without there occurring the brain events which
usually make your muscles contract when you raise your arm. We
may have several possibilities for moving a certain stone, e.g. by
pushing it with our hand or by using a stick, but we (or most
of us) cannot, for example, just focus on it and move it in the
immediate way in which we can move our arms.
God, being almighty and having no body, is not constrained
like this. There is no thing which he always has to use in order
to bring something about. He does not have to use anything in
order to bring about a certain event. He can bring about any
event directly. God can move a stone by moving some other
stone, which then pushes it. But he can also move the stone
without using another material object. The movement of the
stone then has no preceding physical cause. In the latter case he
brings about the intended event more directly than in the former.
The divine willing view assumes that the most direct way in
which God can bring about an event in the universe, like the
beginning of the universe or a miracle, is through an undertaking.
But why should God, in order to create a universe, first bring
about an event in his mind, an undertaking, which then causes
the universe? For us men all choice events are undertakings,
which, if the action succeeds, initiate a causal process leading
to the intended event. But that is a limitation of power. God
can bring about the universe straight away, without delay, as a
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choice event. God can bring about any event as a choice event.
That is what his omnipotence consists in. God is entirely aware
of the action, and he brings about the choice event consciously,
but there is no event in his mind that is a preceding cause and
hence an event cause of the intended event in the universe. We
can call this view the ‘direct divine action’ view. To have a body
– more precisely, to be able to act only through a body – is a
limitation of one’s power. We can make a difference to the world
around us only through the chunk of matter which is our body,
and we can direct our body only through tryings. But God has
unlimited power and thus no body; he can make a difference to
the world other than through certain events in his mind and a
particular chunk of matter. Whatever God chooses to happen
happens without having a preceding cause.
How is this view compatible with the plausible assumption
that divine actions can be explained through God’s having cer-
tain reasons and aims in mind? The defender of the divine willing
view can assume that the undertaking or volition contains an in-
tention and an awareness of reasons. He could even hold that the
undertaking or volition has divine mental events such as aware-
ness of reasons as preceding causes. But in my view this is a
false conception of acting for a reason. In acting for a reason we
look at a reason in our mind and then respond to it by acting.
If some state of our mind or of our brain pushes us to act, then
that is not a reason motivating an action, because then the ac-
tion is not an active response to a reason but a passive effect.3
If someone does something for a reason, then neither the reason
nor the belief in or awareness of the reason is an event cause of
the action. The ‘acting on’ is not reducible to some other re-
lation. It is something mental, something to which the subject
has privileged access. If someone saw a reason (or believed to
3As argued also by Lowe 2008, ch. 8 and Wachter 2009, § 8.4.
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see it) and acted on it, that explains the action. In a very wide
sense, such as the meaning of the Greek notionit—a, you can
still call the reason or the awareness of it a ‘cause’ of the action,
but not in the sense of efficient causation or event causation or
law-governed causation. So according to the direct divine action
view, God performs his actions with intentions and in the light
of reasons, but his having an aim in mind and his being aware
of reasons do not cause his action.
5 Basic actions
Is my claim that God can bring about any event as a choice event
the same as William Alston’s suggestion that any action of God
may be basic? And if not (as I shall suggest), are both claims
true? We find Alston’s suggestion in his article ‘Can We Speak
Literally of God?’ (1981):
[The general concept of a basic action is] the concept
of an action that is not performed by or in (simul-
taneously) performing some other action. It is just
a fact about human beings (not a general constraint
on action or basic action) that only movements of
certain parts of their bodies are under their direct
voluntary control and that anything else they bring
off, they must accomplish by moving their bodies in
certain ways. If I am to knock over a vase or make
a soufflé or communicate with someone, I must do so
by moving my hands, legs, vocal organs, or whatever.
But that is only because of my limitations. We can
conceive of agents, corporeal or otherwise, such that
things other than their bodies (if any) are under their
direct voluntary control. Some agents might be such
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that they could knock over a vase or bring a soufflé
into being without doing something else in order to
do so. (Alston 1981, p. 61)
[A]ll God’s actions might be basic actions. If any
change whatsoever could conceivably be the core of a
basic action, and if God is omnipotent, then clearly,
God could exercise direct voluntary control over every
change in the world which he influences by his activ-
ity. (Alston 1981, 61 f)
[An omnipotent deity] could ordain that intentions
can directly cause a parting of waters. (Alston 1981,
p. 62)
The last sentence implies that if God lets the waters part in
the most direct way, the parting of the waters is caused by his
‘intentions’. Presumably ‘intentions’ are events in God’s mind.
So Alston does not put forward my claim that God can bring
about any event, e.g. the parting of waters, as a choice event.
Let us have a closer look at what a basic action is and how this
relates to choice events. Roughly, to say that Miller’s doing x
was more basic than his doing y means that it is true to say that
Miller did y by doing x. To say that Miller’s doing x was a basic
action means that Miller did not do x by doing something else,
he just did it. (Below, I shall modify this definition with respect
to ‘doing’ and ‘trying’.) So being a basic action and x being
a more basic action than y applies to actions under a certain
description. Therefore one can also call one description of an
action more basic than another one. It makes no sense to point
at someone’s moving finger and say ‘That was a basic action’. If
the person was pointing towards the Sun by moving his finger,
then his moving his finger was a basic action, but his pointing
towards the Sun was not. To take another example, ‘If I sign
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my name, that is done by moving my hand in a certain way, so
the action is not basic; but if moving my hand is not done by
doing something else, it will count as a basic action.’ (Alston
1981, p. 55) What is this relationship between the moving the
hand and the signing? In some sense these are identical. They
are somehow two descriptions referring to the same object or
the same action. But they are descriptions of a certain kind.
‘Webster caused the movement of neuron B in his brain’ (so that
his arm rose) is not a more basic action than ‘Webster raised
his arm’, because although both are somehow descriptions of the
same event, it is not true in the sense in question that Webster
moved B.
Richard Swinburne (1997, p. 87, following Danto 1965 and
Baier 1971) distinguishes teleologically from causally basic ac-
tions. That an action under description B is teleologically more
basic than an action under description A, means that the agent
does A following the recipe ‘Do B’, whilst he does B naturally,
not following a recipe. That an action under the description B
is causally more basic than an action under description A means
that the agent does A by doing B with the intention that B has
certain effects.
Both these kinds of basicality as well as Alston’s notion of
a basic action concern the intention governing an action. The
reason wherefore ‘Webster caused the movement of neuron B in
his brain’ (so that his arm rose) is not a more basic action than
‘Webster raised his arm’ is that Webster had no intention to move
neuron B, he did not think of neuron B in any way. With action
descriptions of the form ‘Webster did so-and-so’ we not only de-
scribe who caused what but also an aspect of the intention. The
intentions governing our actions cover a certain range, or they
have a width, so that several descriptions apply to them. An ac-
tion description does not describe what this range is but captures
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only one aspect of the intention. Therefore we sometimes give
several descriptions of an action. ‘Jones shot a moose yesterday’
does not entail ‘Jones bent his forefinger’, nor does the latter
entail the former. Jones could have shot by bending his middle
finger, and he could have bent his forefinger in order to switch
on the light. Further, the descriptions of the physical events do
not entail with which intention the agent acted. Assume that the
bullet first killed a sparrow and then a fly sitting on the moose.
To say that Jones intentionally killed the sparrow but did not
intentionally kill the fly (because he did not even see it) would
then provide additional information about the intention.
Swinburne’s distinction between two kinds of basicality reflects
two aspects or dimensions in intentions. One is that in some ac-
tions we follow, as Swinburne says, a ‘recipe’. One could include
here also recipes of the form ‘Do B, then C, then D’. In order to
make a soufflé, crack four eggs, whip the egg whites, add a bit of
lemon juice, etc. But then my raising my arm 2 cms would be
more basic than my raising my arm 10 cms, and there would be
no basic action. We better call B, C, and D just ‘parts’ of the ac-
tion and restrict teleological basicality to actions where we know
that doing B constitutes doing A. For example, in order to enter
into a contract, you have to write your name at the right place
on a piece of paper with the text of the contract. That an agent
follows a recipe of this kind means that he does certain things
with certain intentions. In this case certain action descriptions
apply so that some are ‘teleologically’ more basic than others.
‘Causal’ basicality reflects a different aspect of an intention.
Jones killed the moose by bending his finger, believing that this
would cause the bullet to fly to the moose, enter into his body,
and damage the organs so that the moose would die. If an in-
tention contains such a belief about what is likely to cause what,
then certain action descriptions apply so that some are ‘causally’
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more basic than others.
Now we see that the question of which action description in
an action is most basic (in each of the senses defined) is differ-
ent from the question of what event an action process begins
with and which event is a choice event. The former question is
about the structure and the content of the intention governing
the action, the latter question is about what event the action
process begins with. Alston does not distinguish between these
questions. He says some things about the action process, but
the question he addresses is whether any action of God could be
‘basic’. He says that God could bring about everything ‘directly’,
but he does not claim anything equivalent to my claim that God
can bring about any event as choice event, because he writes only
that he ‘could ordain that intentions can directly cause a parting
of waters’. I take it that ‘intentions’ here refers to a kind of event
in God’s mind. So it entails that the parting of the waters is
caused by an intention in God’s mind and thus has a preceding
cause. Thus also Alston presupposes the divine willing view and
assumes that the Big Bang has an undertaking preceding cause.4
Having distinguished the question about basic actions from the
question about choice events, we can now answer both questions
for man and for God.
4The following passage points towards rejecting the divine willing view:
‘Of course, one can think of God as creating light by saying to himself, “Let
there be light”, or as parting the sea of reeds by saying to himself, “Let
the sea of reeds be parted”. In that case the basic actions would be mental
actions. But [. . . ] we are not conceptually required to postulate this mental
machinery. We could think just as well of the coming into being of light or of
the parting of the sea of reeds as directly under God’s voluntary control.’ (p.
61) But Alston then spells this out as intentions causing a parting of waters.
This suggests that he does not endorse my claim that a parting of waters
can be a choice event and thus have no preceding cause at all.
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6 Human basic actions
One might want to say that all human basic actions are tryings,
because it is true to say that ‘I raise my arm by trying (undertak-
ing) to raise my arm’. But there is a good reason for not saying
this and for taking my raising my arm to be a basic action (as
Alston does). ‘I raised my arm’ and ‘I tried (undertook) to raise
my arm’ are not only rightly called the same action, but unlike
‘I killed him’ and ‘I bent my finger’ they also refer to the same
aspect of my intention. They are like ‘He raised his arm’ and
‘He performed a raising of his arm’. Therefore it is adequate to
say that in human actions involving body movements, the basic
actions are not tryings but body movements.
In human mental actions, i.e. actions that do not involve a
body movement, the basic actions are of various kinds. I mem-
orise a phone number by transforming it into a mnemotechnical
code; I multiply 31 with 12 by first multiplying 31 with ten and
then adding 31 multiplied with 2; I imagine the sound of the dom-
inant seventh chord on A flat by first imagining the A flat, then
the major third, then the perfect fifth, then the minor seventh.
Some human mental actions involve a trying, others do not.
My calculating the square root of 961 involves a trying. If I fail
to calculate it, I have still tried. However, if you make a New
Year’s resolution to give up drinking Coca Cola, then there is
no mental event of trying or undertaking besides the making the
resolution. Likewise when you promise to God that for the next
seven days you shall get up every morning at 5.30 a.m. to read
the Bible and pray, then there is no trying. You either do it, or
you do not. You can think about doing it, but to undertake it is
to do it.
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7 What do human actions begin with?
The action processes in human actions begin with tryings. The
choice event in a human action process is a trying. The trying
in a human action has no preceding cause and causes, perhaps
together with certain brain events, the intended result of the ac-
tion. Perhaps the tryings are identical to or somehow linked with
simultaneous brain events. Let us consider three possibilities of
how the trying may be related to brain events. How these possib-
ilities are to be described also depends on whether one means by
an ‘event’, or a ‘state of affairs’, just the property of a thing at or
during a certain time (or somehow the change of a property) or
the property plus the (rest of the) thing. To sort this out is not
our task here, I shall try to use formulations that are intuitively
clear.
1. Maybe the trying is an event in an immaterial soul and
neither identical to a brain event nor linked to a simul-
taneous brain event, and it is the complete cause of a sub-
sequent change of the properties of some things in the brain
(that is, the cause of something that happens with some
things in the brain, e.g. a neuron firing), so that the new
brain state, B2, together with other (simultaneous) brain
states, B2*, causes the intended result of the action. The
things that are moved or changed by the trying, or the
stuff which the trying affects, exist already before B2. (A
further possibility would be that the trying is the complete
cause of some thing a’s being F, where a has not existed
before but is completely new stuff.)
2. Maybe the trying is an event in an immaterial soul and
neither identical to a brain event nor linked to a simul-
taneous brain event, and together with simultaneous brain
events, B1, it constitutes the initial stage of the action pro-
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cess and thus causes the intended result of the action. (If
we want to exclude that possibility (2) is a special case of
(1), we have to add that neither the trying nor B1 is the
complete cause of any later event.)
3. Maybe the trying is identical to, or constituted by, or some-
how necessarily linked to, a brain event, which together
with other (simultaneous) brain events constitutes the ini-
tial stage of the action process and thus causes the intended
result of the action.
We do not need to decide here which of these three possibilities
is true. In either case, the trying is the choice event and at least a
part of the initial stage of the action process. Let us now consider
which divine actions are basic.
8 Divine basic actions
Alston suggests, as we have seen, that ‘all God’s actions might be
basic actions’ (Alston 1981, p. 61), but I shall argue that there
are causally and teleologically non-basic divine actions.5 God
5Tanner (1988, 82 ff) claims that each event that is caused by God is
brought about directly, as a basic action. Tracy (1994) objects that this
excludes the causal activity of creatures and that indirect divine actions
are also possible. Two further authors who claim that all God’s actions
are in some sense basic are Jantzen (1984, p. 87) and Ellis (1984, p. 232).
Kirkpatrick argues that divine acts need not all be basic. God might utilise
‘the causal mechanisms of the world’ (Kirkpatrick 1994, p. 191). That is
easily granted, but Kirkpatrick also seems to suggest that there are no divine
basic actions or no interventions (‘with the possible exception of the original
creative act that brings into existence all the causal mechanisms by which
all future acts will be carried out’ (192)). ‘Might it not make more sense
biblically and philosophically if we think of God’s acts as the utilization of
various segments of the causal order in order to achieve divine ends?’ That
applies to some cases, but it makes no sense, biblically or philosophically, to
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can choose to bring about an event by bringing about another
event which would then cause it. For example, God can choose
to bring about a Big Bang so that, while God sustains it so that
it itself becomes a cause (a so-called ‘secondary’ cause), it leads
later to the existence of carbon atoms. Or he can bring about a
storm in order to bring about a parting of waters. Like in human
actions we can call the causal process leading to the intended
result the ‘action process’. A difference to human actions is that
God is aware of all events in the action process, whereas men
are unaware of the events in their brain. Therefore for each
event in the action process it is true to say that God brought it
about intentionally. If A and B are events in the action process
and A begins earlier than B, then God’s bringing about A is
causally more basic than his bringing about B. For example,
God’s bringing about the Big Bang was causally more basic than
his creating the first carbon atom. The causally most basic action
is his bringing about the first event of the action process (more
precisely, his bringing about any event which begins with the
action process). This event is a choice event; it has no preceding
cause.
Occasionalists, like al-Ghazali, Nicholas of Autrecourt, and
Nicholas Malebranche, hold that God brings about every event
in the universe directly. There is no secondary causation, i.e.
no causation through created things. On this view there are no
causally non-basic actions. But if God sustains things in being so
that they can cause something, then God can cause x intending
that x shall cause y.
Are there teleologically non-basic actions of God? Yes, because
some actions one can only do by doing something else. Even God
cannot give a promise to Abraham without doing something else,
namely speaking to him. Even God cannot punish a man without
assume that God never brings about any event in the universe directly.
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doing something else, for example ending his life or subjecting
him to fire and brimstone. In some of these cases the teleologic-
ally most basic action is God’s bringing about a certain physical
event. However, it is not true to say that God’s bringing about
a certain physical event is always a teleologically basic action.
God’s bringing about a universe is not teleologically basic, be-
cause he does it by bringing about certain events. Because God
is aware of all of the details of an event, his intention refers to
them all. As no human description of an event captures all its
details, no human description of a divine action ever describes a
teleologically basic action. Even if the description were of infin-
ite length, God’s intention would contain a richer representation
of the event. There are, however, descriptions of divine actions
that are teleologically more basic than others.
That God knows all of the details of an event is only one reason
why his intentions that govern his actions are much wider than
ours. They are maximally wide. God is aware of all reasons for
an action as well as of all probabilities of what will cause what.
Therefore he does nothing unintentionally; everything God does,
he does intentionally. Something I say in a talk might encourage
someone in the audience to start to study the special theory of
relativity in order to examine whether there is really evidence
for assuming that the speed of light is always c. But I do not
know the man and had not thought of encouraging anyone to
do such a thing. It is then true to say that I unintentionally
encouraged the man to examine the theory of special relativity.
For God no such scenarios arise. Everything he does, he does
intentionally. Therefore by each action God does every action
which it is possible that he does by it. For each divine action the
range of the teleologically less basic actions is maximal.
Because God knows all reasons for an action, all probabilities
of what will cause what, and all states of affairs obtaining at the
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time of his action, the width of his intentions is also maximal
with respect to causal basicality. In one sense every event in the
universe can be said to be brought about by God, because he at
least sustained it and its causes. If doing x is causally basic with
respect to doing y, then the agent believes that with a certain
probability x will cause y (or the event bringing about which
constitutes doing y). However, that probability need not be the
degree to which y was the motive for doing x. I might throw a
lifebelt from the ship into the water hoping that the drowning
woman will catch it. Even though the probability of her catching
it because of the storm is low, rescuing her is my sole and whole
motive.
Because God is perfectly rational, only reasons motivate him.
The motive of an action of God is constituted by the sum of the
motivating value (or ‘force’) of all states of affairs that may be
brought about by the action. The motivating value of such a
states of affairs is proportional to the product of its goodness (or
badness) and the probability of it being caused by the action. If
God’s doing x causes an event y, then it is true to say that God’s
doing x was causally basic with respect to y to the degree corres-
ponding to its motivating value. Also if God’s doing x did not
cause y, but there was a probability that it would, the probabil-
ity of y was a part of God’s motivation for doing x (according to
the product of their goodness and their probability) – although
it is not true to say that God brought about y.
Likewise actions of man are parts of God’s motivation for doing
the things which make these actions possible (sustaining certain
things as well as intervening in certain ways). For good human
actions, that is called God’s providence. If a man does some-
thing, then it is normally not true to say that God did it. But
it is true that God permitted the action through his sustaining
the man, and it can be true that God somehow led him to do
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it, for example by giving him certain inclinations or insights or
commands. Actual as well as possible human actions are parts of
God’s motivation for some of his actions in accordance to their
value and their likelihood (which depends on man’s recognition
of reasons, his inclinations, his character, and the strength of his
will). But, as I said, if it is true to say that x did y, then it is
normally not true to say that God did y.
Now let us again consider the question of what God’s actions
begin with, which is distinct from the question of which divine
actions are basic.
9 What do divine actions begin with?
The divine willing view rests on the thought: ‘An action is ini-
tiated by an undertaking (or “trying” or “willing”), an under-
taking is a mental event, therefore God’s actions in the universe
are initiated by undertakings, which are events in God’s mind.’
Of course, also if God acts, in some sense he ‘wills’ and ‘under-
takes’ the action. But only if ‘willing x’ and ‘undertaking x’ are
taken to mean ‘doing x intentionally’, and not if they are taken
to mean, as I have defined it in accordance with what the de-
fenders of the divine willing view mean, a mental event of the
kind that occurs in human actions. A free action is initiated by
a choice event, and that choice event may, but need not be, an
undertaking in the mind of the agent. As God is omnipotent and
has no body, he can bring about any physical event as a choice
event, so that it has no preceding cause. ‘God brings about E
directly’ is to be spelled out as God bringing about that event
as a choice event. That event then, alone or together with other
events, is the initial stage of the action process.
I conclude that God can bring about any event as a choice
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event, so that it has no preceding cause and thus no event cause.
Therefore, if God brought about the Big Bang (and it was the
beginning of the universe), then the Big Bang had no preceding
cause. God brought it about directly.
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